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Chapter 8
Modest Sociality, Minimal Cooperation 
and Natural Intersubjectivity
Michael Wilby
Abstract What is the relation between small-scale collaborative plans and the exe-
cution of those plans within interactive contexts? I argue here that joint attention has 
a key role in explaining how shared plans and shared intentions are executed in 
interactive contexts. Within singular action, attention plays the functional role of 
enabling intentional action to be guided by a prior intention. Within interactive joint 
action, it is joint attention, I argue, that plays a similar functional role of enabling 
the agents to act in a collaborative way such that their actions are rationally guided 
by a prior shared intention. This understanding of joint attention – as having a key 
functional role of enabling the rational guidance of joint intentional action by a prior 
shared intention – allows for an alternative understanding of the kind of minimal 
cooperation that infants can engage in. On this understanding, infants’ capacity to 
engage in joint actions is already an incipient capacity to engage in rational and 
intentional joint actions, albeit a capacity that is necessarily scaffolded by an adult 
rational co-partner.
Keywords Modest sociality · Minimal cooperation · Michael Bratman · Natural 
pedagogy · Shared intentions · Collective intentionality · Joint action · Joint 
attention · Natural intersubjectivity.
Joint action and shared collaborative activity can take place in a multitude of ways. 
There are long-term institutionalised collaborations – such as the construction of the 
International Space Station – occurring within a hierarchical structure, containing 
defined roles, interchangeable agents, and taking place over vast stretches of space 
and time. At a more modest level, there are non-institutionalised, not necessarily 
hierarchically-based, small-scale collaborative plans, such as going on a family trip, 
or hosting a surprise birthday party. At an even more fine-grained level, there are 
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on-the-hoof, face-to-face interactions, such as taking a walk together, or moving an 
obstacle out of the way of the road.
In a way that runs partly parallel to this, the literature on Collective Intentionality 
and Shared Agency has tended to focus on three families of collaborative activities:
 (a) Massively Shared Agency
 (b) Modest Sociality
 (c) Minimal Cooperation
The first has cross-over with topics in political philosophy, the second with top-
ics in philosophy of mind, and the third with topics in the philosophy of cognitive 
science.1
It is not obvious, or perhaps even plausible, to suppose that there might be one 
overriding framework to capture all of these and related phenomena. Yet there 
remain questions of how they relate to each other. On the face of it, in at least some 
central cases, massively shared agency would not be possible without forms of 
modest sociality, and modest sociality would not be possible without forms of mini-
mal cooperation. So the different areas must interface with each other in some 
places and at some points.
My concern here will be with the relation between (b) and (c). In particular, 
rather than discussing Minimal Cooperation as an alternative type of cooperation to 
Modest Sociality, I want to discuss the form that Minimal Cooperation might take 
when viewed as a way of executing shared (prior) intentions that arise as elements 
of plans within Modest Sociality (Bratman 1999, 2014). Approaching Minimal 
Cooperation in this manner, will, I think, allow for a different emphasis on what is 
required of the type of cooperation that humans might engage in at the face-to-face 
level. This kind of project differs in emphasis from the projects that have tended to 
motivate accounts of Minimal Cooperation.2 The explicit motivation for such mini-
mal accounts has tended to point to the discrepancy between childrens’ capacity for 
shared agency, on the one hand, and the cognitively-heavy demands that accounts of 
Modest Sociality put on the protagonists, on the other. That is: infants can engage in 
collaborative activities, but they don’t seem to have the sophisticated metarepresen-
tational capacities that theories of Modest Sociality typically require agents to have 
for shared agency (Tollefsen 2005; Pacherie 2011; Butterfill 2012; Fantasia et al. 
2014). The apparent discrepancy has led some to argue either that (a) Minimal 
Cooperation is to be applied to a distinct explanandum to that to which Modest 
Sociality applies – i.e., that collaborative infants are engaging in something other 
than genuine shared agency; or that (b) Minimal Cooperation is an alternative 
1 See, for instance, the collection of articles in Chant et al. (2014) which cover a range of ground. 
The phrase ‘massively shared agency’ comes from Shapiro (2014).
2 Although (see Pacherie 2013 and Tollefsen 2014), for approaches similar to the one I shall be 
adopting. The question of how prior intentions can ‘interface’ with motor representations in the 
individual case is a topic that is beginning to receive quite a lot of attention, see in particular 
Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2014), Mylopolous and Pacherie (2017), Brozzo (2017), Brownstein 
(2014), and Shepherd (2017).
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explanans for the same phenomena that Modest Sociality is tackling  – i.e., that 
infants do engage in genuine shared agency, but it should be modelled in an alterna-
tive way to the way in which it is modelled in the adult case (see Butterfil and 
Sebanz 2011 for a summary of these alternatives). There might well be room for 
both of these views – collaborative activities come in a range of flavours after all – 
and neither need be seen as competitors to accounts of Modest Sociality, which, on 
Bratman’s view at least, is multiply realisable.
My aim here is slightly different. I want to question what kind of account of 
Minimal Cooperation would be required for agents who can engage in the more 
sophisticated form of Modest Sociality, in a way that makes rational contact with 
the plans, conceptions and schemes that such agents are involved in. I shall argue 
that by taking such an approach we will find that we can understand forms of mini-
mal cooperation that are at once suitable for those agents who see those minimal 
collaborations as elements within larger plans (i.e. adults), and for those agents who 
are not yet capable of seeing their collaborations in such terms (i.e. infants and 
young children). This is a useful endeavour because: (a) much – although not all – 
of the evidence that relates to infant social capacities is in their interactions with 
adults; and (b) it gives a glimpse into the question of how infants might be initiated 
into more sophisticated normative commitments and reason-giving that comes with 
engagement in larger plans and activities.
This chapter will be split into three parts: Sect. 8.1 shall outline an understanding 
of shared intentions within Modest Sociality, based on Michael Bratman’s work. 
Section 8.2 shall outline the notion of (what I shall call) Natural Intersubjectivity, 
which regards joint attention as having a pivotal role in coordinating and explaining 
small-scale interactions – of the kind that Minimal Cooperation is often used to 
explain – as manifestations of shared intentions. Section 8.3 shall argue that this 
notion of Natural Intersubjectivity is able to say something about the development 
of young children’s sociality, enculturalisation and mindreading skills.
8.1  Modest Sociality
The term Modest Sociality refers to shared agency – i.e. shared intentions and their 
attendant cooperative actions – within small adult groups, in the absence of asym-
metric, hierarchical authority relations that typically constitute social relations 
within institutional structures. As Bratman puts it, the focus of Modest Sociality is:
primarily with duets and quartets rather than symphony orchestras with conductors, with 
small teams of builders rather than large and hierarchically structured companies, with 
small and informal neighbourhood groups rather than county governments, with small 
group discussion rather than deliberations in the US Senate, and with friendship and love 
rather than legally constituted marriage (Bratman 2014: 7).
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Bratman distils his account of Modest Sociality3 into the following elements, 
which he states are “somewhat compressed sufficient conditions for our shared 
intention to J” (Bratman 2014: 103)4:
 (a) Intention condition: We each have intentions that we J; and we each intend that we J by way 
of each of our intentions that we J … and by way of relevant mutual responsiveness in sub- 
plan and action, and so by way of sub-plans that mesh.
 (b) Belief condition: We each believe that if the intentions of each in favour of our J-ing persist, 
we will J by way of those intentions and relevant mutual responsiveness in sub-plan and 
action; and we each believe that there is interdependence in persistence of those intentions of 
each in favour of our J-ing.
 (c) Interdependence condition: There is interdependence in persistence of the intentions of each 
in favour of our J-ing.
 (d) Common knowledge condition: It is common knowledge that a–d.
 (e) Mutual responsiveness condition: Our shared intention to J leads to our J-ing by way of 
public mutual responsiveness in sub-intention and action that tracks the end intended by each 
of the joint activity by way of intentions of each in favour of that joint activity.
(a)–(d) relate to shared intentions, typically held prior to the joint action which 
they motivate, while (e) relates to the execution of those shared intentions within 
joint action. The core element to focus on here is the Intention Condition. The Belief 
Condition, Interdependence Condition and Common Knowledge Condition serve as 
ways of stabilising collaborations, to ensure smooth running, trust, mutual delibera-
tion and bargaining. I shall turn to the Mutual Responsiveness Condition in Sect. 
8.1.2, since this is where the account makes most obvious contact with Minimal 
Cooperation.
Consider an example. Suppose that we intend to dance the tango together. What 
does such an intention involve? The account parses this intention as follows: we 
each have an intention that we dance the tango, and we each intend that we dance 
the tango by way of each of those very intentions, as well as by way of relevant 
meshing sub-plans and actions. What makes the shared intention to dance the tango 
together different from us each having our own private intention to dance with the 
other is that we each intend that the dance come about by way of each of our respec-
tive intentions (and our respective and meshing sub-plans and actions by which we 
will realise this action). If all goes to plan, we will end with a joint action that comes 
about by way of each of our respective intentions – and meshing sub-plans – to 
perform that joint action.
Bratman’s approach is, as he calls it, Constructivist. Constructivism can be seen 
as a general methodological approach to understanding complex phenomena that 
constructs those complex phenomena out of simpler building blocks (Grice 1974). 
In the case of social agency, the building blocks are features of individual agency 
that combine to generate social phenomena. This is achieved, on Bratman’s account, 
3 There are a number of rival accounts of Modest Sociality (most notably Gilbert 2009; Searle 
1990; Tuomela 2007), but I shall focus here on Bratman’s account at least partly because of its 
starting assumption of constructivism.




by putting the weight of the analysis on the content of the intentions. The intentions 
are standard, individual intentions. Within social contexts, they take on the same 
functional and normative load, as they would do within individual contexts. They 
are distinctively social only insofar as (a) two agents are involved; and (b) the con-
tent of the agents’ intentions make reference to a joint activity and to the other 
agent’s intentions with regards to that joint activity.
In order to do its Constructivist job there is already much that is contained within 
the form of an intention on Bratman’s account. I shall discuss this now in a bit more 
detail, for, in doing so, we should be able to get a better grip on the challenges 
involved in working out how Bratmanian Modest Sociality can join-up with a more 
Minimal Coordination.
8.1.1  The Planning Theory of Intention
The central building block of Bratmanian Modest Sociality is the Planning Theory 
of Intention (Bratman 1987, 2007) that applies in the first instance to individuals. It 
resists the traditional idea that intentions can be understood reductively in terms of 
clusters of beliefs and desires. Rather, intentions are distinctive states of mind that 
are “typically elements within larger plans” (Bratman 1987: 28). Their functional 
role is to help coordinate our activities (both personal and social) in a way that com-
pensates for our limited cognitive resources of memory, time and processing power. 
I shall outline some of the key feature of this theory.
Firstly, plans are hierarchical and partial. If one has an intention to give a talk 
in a far-away country, then that intention will be a core element of the plan that it 
generates. The plan will be hierarchical: the intention generates and embeds further 
sub-intentions (buying a ticket, booking accommodation, writing the talk), all of 
which can be decomposed into further embedded sub-sub-intentions. The plan is 
also partial: if I am to give a talk at the conference, then at some point I will need to 
find my way from my accommodation to the lecture hall – but that part of the plan 
can be left to later; I don’t need to fill in all the elements in advance.
Secondly, plans are stable in ends and more flexible in means. By intending to 
give a talk in a far-away country, I thereby settle on a course of action and start 
thinking of a partial plan of how to fulfil it. The intention is stable in that it provides 
a settled objective, around which one draws up one’s plans. Once it is in place, then 
there is a presumption of inertia that one will carry out the intention. This stability 
of ends allows for a flexibility of means – the lower down the hierarchy one goes the 
more flexibility one will allow in one’s sub-intentions, so as to fulfil one’s more 
robust core intention (e.g. one might intend to take the 10.00 am flight, but if that 
flight is not available, then, all else being equal, one will book a later flight, rather 
than just abandoning one’s intention to give a talk).
Thirdly, plans are subject to norms of consistency. Plans, and the elements of 
which they are composed, must be coherent, both internally and epistemically. For 
instance, one shouldn’t intend that one give a talk at the same time that one is 
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intending to visit a sick relative. Nor should one intend to give a public talk at a 
place where one believes no-one will be. When one buys a plane ticket one should 
ensure that it goes to the place where one intends to give the talk, and one should 
make sure it goes from an airport which is most appropriate for one to reach. All of 
this will require an internal means-end coherence between intentions and sub- 
intentions; consistency across intentions and across beliefs, as well as consistency 
in the agglomeration of plans, intentions and beliefs.
Fourthly, intentions are motivational. Intentions, in addition to the structural role 
mentioned above, provide agents with a conative, pro-attitude towards acting in a 
way that fulfils their content.
As can be seen from this, the emphasis on intentions as typically being elements 
of plans is an emphasis on future-directed intentions. This opens up the question of 
how intentions – as elements of partial plans – are connected to intentional actions. 
In order to approach this question, I want to make use of a three-way distinction, 
adapted from Elisabeth Pacherie (2006, 2011).
We can distinguish between: (i) distal intentions; (ii) proximal intentions; (iii) 
intentions in action.
The first are future-directed intentions, with a stability of content, subject to 
norms of consistency, and that generate, and are elements of, small-scale partial 
plans. We can note three aspects of these kinds of intentions: (a) They are states of 
intention, rather than intentional actions; (b) they tend to specify types of outcomes – 
e.g. that I present a talk in Geneva – rather than token actions; (c) because they 
specify general outcomes – states of affairs – rather than specific actions, then they 
can naturally be described with a ‘that clause’.5
The second are intentions that are directed towards particular token actions or 
token outcomes at a particular time – e.g. that I start speaking now. They will tend 
to be sub-intentions (or sub-sub-intentions, etc.) and so will tend to be more flexible 
and context-driven. We can note three aspects of these kinds of intentions: (a) They 
are states of intention, rather than intentional actions; (b) they tend to specify par-
ticular, token actions, rather than generalised outcomes; (c) when they specify par-
ticular actions, then they are most naturally described using the grammatical 
construction of ‘intention to’.
The third are the execution of an intention. We can note three aspects of these 
kinds of intentions: (a) they are intentional actions, rather than states of intention; 
(b) because they are actions, then they involve token actions rather than types of 
actions or generalised states of affairs; (c) because they are actions, then they are 
most naturally described using the grammatical adverb ‘intentionally’.
5 The grammatical object of an ‘intention that’ takes a propositional form, rather than an agential 
or infinitival form (see Ferrero 2013). Consequently, an ‘intention that’ needn’t (but could) be self-
reflexive: One could intend, for instance, that a parcel be delivered (if one were a manager of a 
postal company, for example), without there being any suggestion that it is oneself who delivers 
the parcel. By contrast, an intention to deliver a parcel – where the grammatical object of such an 
intention is an action, with a hidden but implied reflexive pronoun (PRO) – implies that the action 
is necessarily carried out by the subject of the sentence.
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This is a very rough sketch of a set of important distinctions within action theory, 
and there is certainly room for both dispute and development with how I have set 
them out. Before turning to the ‘Interface Problem’ of how Future-Directed 
Intentions relate to Intentional Actions, I want to briefly say something about how 
the Planning Theory relates to shared intentions.
8.1.2  Shared Intentions and the Planning Theory
The Planning Theory tells us that there is more to having a shared intention that we 
J than merely two agents having volitional mental states with interlocking contents. 
It tells us, rather, that the agents have a shared plan.
In particular, it is worth making a distinction – which can be easily blurred – 
between a prior intention and a plan. Intentions are elements of plans. The plan itself 
is composed of a number of intentions which relate to each other in a hierarchical 
and coherent manner. If we think of a plan as something like a hierarchically struc-
tured ‘to-do list’, then there is a sense in which agents with shared intentions (which 
are in fact two intentions that interlock) genuinely share a plan (as a singular thing). 
Without a sense that there is one plan in place, then the constraints of coherence and 
consistency will get lost. The agents in question might possess different copies of 
this plan (different vehicles of the plan exist in the different agents heads), and the 
copies will likely contain different details which are relevant to playing ‘their part’, 
but, if there is to be the interconnectedness that is required – of coherence, consis-
tency and agglomeration – then there is a sense in which there is a singular plan that 
the agents are both consulting. (It might be that the Common Knowledge Condition 
in Bratman’s condensed outline effectively plays the role of making this plan public, 
but I shan’t discuss that here).
8.1.3  Shared Intentions and Mutual Responsiveness
We have established the following set of distinctions between three faces of inten-
tions (Table 8.1):
If the above is correct, then, in the execution of a prior intention (which might be 
dispersed and discontinuous over time), we move from the general to the specific, 
from intended outcomes to executed actions, and from an intention that to an 
Table 8.1 Three faces of intention
Future-directed Present-directed Intentional action
Intention that p Intention to φ φ-ing intentionally
General Specific Specific
Directed at outcomes Directed at actions Actions
8 Modest Sociality, Minimal Cooperation and Natural Intersubjectivity
134
 intention to. In Bratman’s account, this is mentioned only insofar as this condition 
obtains:
 (e) Mutual Responsiveness Condition: Our shared intention to J leads to our J-ing by way of 
public mutual responsiveness in sub-intention and action that tracks the end intended by each 
of the joint activity by way of intentions of each in favour of that joint activity.
Although this doesn’t tell us how the aspects are interfaced, it is useful to con-
sider, since it contains within it all three faces of (shared) intention: the shared 
future-directed intention; the shared present-directed intention; and the shared 
intentional activity (Tollefsen 2014). That is to say, ‘our shared intention to J’ can 
be understood as a shared future-directed intention. Our ‘sub-intentions’ can be 
understood as being – depending on context – either future-directed sub-intentions, 
or present-directed intentions, and ‘our J-ing’ can be understood as a shared inten-
tional activity.
So, we can parse the Mutual Responsiveness Condition as follows: our each 
intending that p (and our each intending that p by way of both those intentions and 
by way of meshing present-directed intentions and meshing actions, etc.), leads to 
our jointly intentionally φ-ing, by way of the ‘public mutual responsiveness’ of each 
of our respective future-directed sub-intentions that q and our present-directed 
intentions to φ that track the future-directed intentions that p.
For instance, suppose that we intend that we dance the tango for the next dance, 
and that this is common knowledge, in that it is something we have openly agreed 
to do. How is this shared intention executed? According to this account, we each 
intend the following: <that we dance the tango by way of each of our intentions to 
do so, as well as by our meshing future-directed sub-plans, our meshing present- 
directed sub-intentions, and our meshing actions>. This is the future-directed shared 
intention. The claim then is that this future-directed intention is executed because it 
‘leads to’ our intentionally dancing this very dance we are dancing together now, 
and it led to this by way of a ‘public mutual responsiveness’ in both our future- 
directed sub-plans (that I hold out my hand, and that you stand up), and our present- 
directed intentions to dance this very dance we are dancing (the lead dancer 
intentionally moving as so, and the follower moving as thus), where these present- 
directed intentions (as well as the future-directed sub-intentions) track the initial 
future-directed intention (the initial agreement) that we dance the tango together.
The account claims that future-directed intentions ‘lead to’ intentional actions by 
way of present-directed intentions that track the future-directed intentions. So, the 
relation between a future-directed intention and an intentional action is not purely 
causal. One way to understand how this tracking exhibits itself in the linguistic 
expression of the intentional action is as an instance of what GEM Anscombe (1957) 
calls ‘the intention with which a thing is done’. So: an intentional action to φ is done 
with the intention that p.6 That linguistically exhibits, but does not yet explain, the 
relation that holds between a future-directed intention and an intentional action.
6 Where there is a future-directed sub-intention that q involved, one might just as truly describe it 
as an intention to φ with the intention that q. For instance, if we have a future-directed intention 
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To conclude this section: I have argued that a joint intentional action can, in some 
cases, be understood in terms of being an executed element of part of a shared prior 
plan. When it is understood in this way, we can describe the action as <jointly φ-ing 
with the intention that p>, where p is the content of the governing intention of the 
plan (and/or sub-plan). For instance, we might be dancing this very dance (a token 
instance of the tango) with the sub-intention that we dance the tango, and the fuller 
prior intention that our guests have an enjoyable evening. Here we have a prior 
shared intention (that our guests have an enjoyable evening) that leads to the joint 
intentional action, which is carried out by way of an intention to dance this very 
dance in a way that tracks both the sub-intention and the fuller prior intention. In a 
hierarchical way, both the sub-intention and, higher up the hierarchy, the prior inten-
tion, continue to shape and direct the execution of the action.7
8.2  Natural Intersubjectivity
How are prior shared intentions able to shape and direct the execution of a close- 
encounter joint action such that the action normatively tracks that prior shared 
intention? The claim that I shall pursue here is that it is via joint attention (or, at 
least, that joint attention has a pivotal role to play). Joint attention, I argue, functions 
to coordinate multiple agent’s actions in a way that allows for the rational execution 
of a prior shared intention.8 This coordination allows for the agents’ prior shared 
intention to guide the joint intentional action in a way that is under the agents’ reli-
able conscious control. By jointly attending to the object, event or activity, the 
agents are able to monitor, control and respond to the ongoing activity, including the 
roles that each agent is playing as well as the salient features of the situation – such 
as the objects of their attention – in a way that normatively tracks, because rationally 
guided by, the shared prior intention.
This conception of a key functional role of attention as a matter of conscious 
rational guidance of action is related to various programmes within the Philosophy 
that we hold a party, that might involve sub-plans that we decorate the room we hire in a colourful 
way. This in turn might lead to the jointly intentionally hanging this decoration here. This action is 
done intentionally. And we can describe it as being doing with the intention that we hold a party. 
And/or we can describe it as done with the intention that we decorate the room colourfully.
7 Recent discussion of the relation between prior intentions and intentions-in-action has centred 
around a two-tier framework, in which a more primitive minimalist system runs partly indepen-
dently of a slower, more purposeful, cognitive system that is conscious and propositional. This 
discussion has involved, inter alia, an account of how primitive agents (animals or infants) might 
be able to engage in joint actions via shared goals in the absence of the former (Butterfill 2012, 
2013); and how the more complex system-2 might interface with the more primitive system-1 
(Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2014; Sinigaglia and Butterfill 2015). See Christensen and Michael 
(2016) for a critical discussion of this proposal.
8 Fiebich and Gallagher (2013) argue for the related idea that Joint Attention has the functional role 
of “[reducing] the risk of shared intention failing” (2013: 586).
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of Attention (Campbell 2002; Wu 2011; Smithies 2011; Watzl 2017). I shall begin 
with a discussion of the relation between attention and action in the individual case, 
and then turn to a discussion of how this plays out in the joint case.
8.2.1  Attention and Rational Guidance
Attention is not sufficient for attentive action. Merely attending to an object or a 
scene is not going to necessitate acting on it (although it might raise urges or suggest 
specific actions). If attention is to have the coordinating and guiding role that I am 
claiming of it, then there needs to be something additional to perceptual attention 
involved; there must also be a conative aspect that combines with the cognitive 
aspect of attention. The additional conative aspect, I suggest, comes in through the 
distal, governing prior intention – when one is acting attentively, then one’s actions 
are under the normative guidance of one’s higher-order intentions/plans by means 
of one’s attention, where such intentions have a motivational force that carries 
through into the executed actions. By extension – in a manner that I shall develop in 
Sect. 8.2.3 – joint intentional action comes to be under the normative guidance of 
prior planned shared intentions by means of joint attention.
There are three aspects of the concept of guidance which are of relevance here.
Firstly, guidance is something achieved by a person rather than by a sub-process, 
or “independent causal mechanism”, such as a motor representation (Frankfurt 
1978). On the assumption that higher-order plans have “agential authority” that 
amounts to a form of ‘self-governance’ (Bratman 2007), then it is these higher-order 
plans that are doing the guiding.
Secondly, guidance is not the same as merely causally effecting an outcome. 
Guidance involves a personal level awareness of what one is doing and needs to do; 
how one is to do it; and of the circumstances that one is in, that would allow one to 
intervene, correct and control one’s actions as and when necessary in order to fulfil 
one’s plans and intentions. Guidance will involve exercising one’s conscious control 
at some moments, submitting to the unreflective, skilled ‘flow’ (Csíkszentmihályi 
1975; 1990; Schear 2013) of action at others, and consciously intervening in or cor-
recting those actions at still others. When one is unreflectively engaged in the flow 
of a skilled activity – as a well-practised pianist might be – then the activity remains 
under the guidance of one’s plans and intentions, such as the intention to play a 
particular piece at a certain tempo (Velleman 2008). The skilled pianist will be 
ready to intervene and correct slips, and be ready to take more active control at cer-
tain points of certain sequences of fine-grained motor control that might at other 
times be performed automatically (see Brozzo 2017).
Attention is a capacity by which one can make rationally informed decisions 
about how or when to control, intervene, correct, or ‘go with the flow’ in pursuit of 
a goal or plan: it is by means of attention that one is able to determine what skills to 
put into action and when, and to which objects or locations one should direct one’s 
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skills towards. If one was not attending to the scene that one was in – the activity 
itself as well as the surroundings – then one would have immense difficulty exercis-
ing one’s capacities successfully. One’s attention can be directed in a ‘top-down’ 
manner, as when one is guiding one’s actions in a controlled and deliberative way; 
or it can grabbed in a ‘bottom-up’ manner by unexpected or unanticipated events in 
the environment, allowing one to intervene or correct when one is acting 
‘automatically’.9 Such unexpected events might require one to change or abort one’s 
more flexible sub-intentions in pursuit of a more robust distal intention, or even to 
unexpectedly achieve one’s intentions and plans by capitalising on a lucky accident. 
The notion of ‘guidance’ allows for unanticipated interruptions – events that grab or 
disrupt one’s attention – to nevertheless have a place within a rational and planned 
intentional schema.
Thirdly, guidance sees an intentional action as an actualisation of a prior inten-
tion. When one’s intentional actions are carried out under the rational guidance of 
one’s prior intention, then we can say that the action is carried out with the intention 
that p, where p is the content of the prior intention.10 When one is acting intention-
ally with the intention that p, then there is a sense in which the planned intention is 
operative in the action, rather than being a mere causal precursor to the action. The 
planned intention, in having ‘agential ‘self-governing’ authority’, has guidance con-
trol of a range of one’s sub-systems and bodily movements. Intentional actions are 
thereby “exercises of conceptual capacities”, to use McDowell’s (2009) phrase.11
8.2.2  Attention and Demonstrative Reference
I have suggested that attention plays a role in exercising the rational guidance of 
intentional action by a prior intention. As we shall discuss in the next section, in the 
case of joint attention, we can say that joint attention takes the role of rationally 
coordinating joint intentional actions such that they are exercises of, because ratio-
nally guided by, a shared prior intention. The question I want to discuss first, in this 
section, is how attention simpliciter realises the broad functional role I have 
sketched.
A key functional role of attention, then, is to enable intentional actions such that 
they are rationally guided by a higher-order intention and plan. How does it do this? 
How is this role realised? Attention can be seen to be a form of demonstrative 
9 Or one can make use of a combination of these and guide one’s attention in a ‘top-down’ manner 
in order to find something that will grab one’s attention and ‘pop-out’ from the scene.
10 And the action can be intentional under more than one description (Davidson 1963), depending 
on the plan/sub-plan that we choose to highlight.
11 Luthra (2016) calls this kind of view Rationalism about agential control: whereby “our ability to 
determine, as agents, how we act consists solely in guidance of our actions through the exercise of 
those sorts of rational capacities—capacities for intention, practical judgment, practical reasoning, 
and the like” (Luthra 2016: 2272)
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 reference (Campbell 2002; Dickie 2015) – a way of specifying particular objects, 
 processes, features, locations or events within one’s perceptual field, that makes 
them accessible to thought; ‘this thing over here’ and ‘that thing over there’. In 
doing this, attention can act as a kind of interface between world, thought and action 
(Campbell 2002, Ch 7). As mentioned earlier, prior intentions will, by their nature, 
be more general than the specific actions that actualise those intentions. Attention 
allows the general to be linked to the particular by identifying particular objects, 
processes, features, locations or events that can act as determinants of the general 
concepts that feature within elements of plans and sub-plans (see Evans 1982, and 
the notion of a fundamental ground of thought, for an outline of how this connection 
might be made).
Suppose, for instance, that one intends that one have baked beans for dinner 
tonight. One needs, in that case, to be able to identify a can of baked beans when one 
sees one. Further, the sub-plans, as and when they come about and get filled in, will 
involve further general concepts that need to be identified and realised by particulars 
in one’s environment (pans, spoons, plates, etc.), as well as particular actions (reach-
ing, grabbing, etc.) and spatial relations (to the right, up the top, to the left, etc.). 
This requires the agent to be able to have demonstrative thoughts about these 
objects, relations and actions, in a way that will link up with the plans. Those 
demonstrative thoughts are grounded in attention – it is by means of attention that 
one can identify that object as a can of baked beans, and that object as a pan, and 
then, when it comes to action, calculate the distance that needs to be traversed 
between them (that distance), and then perhaps, by means of indexical predicates, 
identify the needed movement and actions: I should do that action (Heal 1997; 
Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2014).12
An intention that specifies, for instance, <that I cook baked beans tonight>, gets 
actualised partly by means of a demonstrative concept grounded in attention that 
specifies <that those are baked beans>. One can then insert that specification into 
the generalised plan, so as to intend the more specific plan <that I cook those beans>, 
eventuating, via numerous further, finer-grained sub-plans, involving pots and pans, 
in an intention to cook the beans, and the very act of intentionally cooking the 
beans. On a hierarchical planning theory, such intentions will be filled out with 
particulars – demonstratives, indexical predicates, etc. – all the way down, as sub- 
plans are filled in. At each stage the plans and sub-plans are guiding the actions by 
means of the attentive reference to places, locations, features, etc., that fulfil the 
plans. The demonstratives have the role of allowing the agent to insert objects, 
actions, properties and locations into a propositional level, planning schema.
To summarise this and the preceding section: I have argued that attention plays 
the role of enabling the rational, guided execution of intentional actions by prior 
intentions and prior plans. It plays this role partly by means of demonstratively 
identifying the specific features of the environment – objects, locations, processes, 
12 Although much of the philosophical and psychological literature on attention has been concerned 




actions – that can act as particular instantiations of the elements that figure in prior 
plans in only a general way. One then acts on those objects, locations, processes and 
actions in accordance with what would be required for the fulfilment of the plans, in 
a way that is guided by those plans, and not merely caused by them. On this picture, 
motor representations play a role as the sub-personal mechanisms by which this 
guidance is carried out, but not as intentions or even intention substitutes (cf, 
Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2014).
8.2.3  Joint Attention and Coordination
The above sketches a role for attention within action, whereby attention is the means 
by which plans and sub-plans can guide intentional actions. I now want to argue that 
joint attention plays a corresponding role in interactive cases of joint agency, where 
part of that corresponding role is to act as a means of rationally coordinating joint 
action in accordance with, because guided by, a prior shared intention.
It is important here to fix the kind of situations I am talking about. There are of 
course ways of executing shared intentions which don’t require interaction. If we 
are searching for a lost dog, for instance, and you go north and I go south, then there 
is no interaction, even though there is a shared intention that the dog be found by 
one of us, and various sub-intentions to be executed in accordance with that plan. 
My concern, rather, is with interactional contexts with coordinated actions. These 
will be cooperatively loaded actions – actions where coordination (and not merely 
‘meshing’) is essential to their fulfilment.
‘Joint attention’, as I shall be using the term, refers to a situation where two or 
more agents are both attending to an event, object, process, feature or location, and 
they are aware of this whole awareness,13 which is to say that their attention, and its 
common content, is ‘out in the open’ and ‘mutually manifest’ to each.14 Attention 
(and by extension joint attention) here is to be understood not as a full-blown propo-
sitional attitude, with a ‘that’-clause and an independently assessable truth-value, 
but rather as an unsaturated demonstrative element that can figure in a propositional 
attitude, such as a demonstrative singular thought, that can, in turn, act as the reali-
sation of an element of a plan. For instance, attention to an object – a can of beans, 
say – can give specific content to a general intention <that one cook beans for dinner 
tonight>, by specifying the particular can of beans that can fulfil that intention.
Now, the claim at hand is that joint attention has the role of coordinating an inter-
active joint action in accordance with, because rational guided by, a shared prior 
13 This way of phrasing it comes from Peacocke (2005).
14 This understanding of joint attention is a short-hand for a number of alternative ways of filling 
out the idea that might take a truncated, iterative, relational or fixed-point form (see Barwise 1988). 
I shall leave it unstated what form it should take, since any attempt to do so would require a full-
length paper of its own, although my sympathies are with the relational approach (Campbell 2005; 
Eilan 2007; Seemann 2012; Wilby 2010).
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intention. Suppose, to take John Searle’s (1990) well known example, we intend 
that we make a Hollandaise Sauce together. We have a plan. We know how to carry 
it out. We know the ingredients needed and the recipe to follow. And we have an 
open agreement that we will make it this afternoon. When the time comes we will 
need to identify the objects, processes, angles, locations, etc., that will be necessary 
to carrying out this prior shared intention. We will need to coordinate on the details – 
we will need to work out who is pouring, who is stirring, where the bowl is, the 
timing, etc. What we attend to will help determine what we use and how we use it 
in a way that tracks the shared prior intention. That we are both attentive to the ele-
ments that comprise the situation we are in is clearly central to linking our activities 
and our plans. It is because we are both attending to the unfolding activities – by 
means of attending to the objects, locations, relations, processes and features of 
those activities – that those activities can be understood as realisations of our shared 
planning. And it is by understanding those activities as realisations of our shared 
planning that allows for the shared planning to rationally guide the ongoing activi-
ties. By moving the pan just so, and cracking the egg just so, we can, providing we 
have a hierarchical plan in place with sub-plans and sub-sub-plans and sub-sub-sub 
plans (etc.), place those very activities into that hierarchical structure. Our respec-
tive attention to the ongoing situation and environment allows us to coordinate our 
actions so that those actions – both before and after execution – can be recognised 
as elements of a plan that we are executing together, and that we must track and 
update together.
One might object at this point that joint attention – in the full-blown ‘mutually 
manifest’ sense – is not needed. Each agent needs to fulfil their own part of the joint 
action, and so needs to attentively monitor what is necessary for playing that part. 
Perhaps that might mean monitoring the other’s actions at times, and the results of 
those actions, but why need there be anything more substantial than that? There is 
no need here, it might be thought, for our respective perceptual attention to be out 
in the open in any robust sense. Perhaps all that is needed is parallel attention to the 
ongoing action.
In response to this objection, it is worth considering what I shall call the guided 
rationality of joint agency. Suppose we are engaging in a joint intentional action 
with the shared intention that we make a Hollandaise Sauce. For this joint action to 
be intentional under this description it must be being guided by that shared inten-
tion; or, at least, that has been the thrust of the argument thus far. This is to say – 
once decomposed into its constructivist Bratmanian elements  – I must be being 
guided by your intention that we make Hollandaise Sause, just as much as I’m 
guided by mine. What would it mean for me to be guided by your intention? How 
can your intention get a grip on me such that it guides my actions? If we were to 
think of your intention guiding my actions in precisely the way that my intention 
sometimes causally controls mine, then we truly would be violating an ‘own action’ 
condition on intention in an implausible way. For it is not as if I can get inside your 
skin, so to speak, and make your limbs move.
One way your intention might be thought to rationally guide my actions would 
be for my actions to be visually guided by your observable limb movements and 
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their effects. I observe you shifting the pan this way, causing me to pour in that way. 
Given that your actions and movements are themselves guided by your intention 
that we make the Hollandaise Sauce, then, it might be argued, if we suppose that 
guidance is transitive, I will thereby be guided by your intention. But this isn’t ratio-
nal guidance. It is, rather, a matter of reactively responding to your guided inten-
tions. Rational guidance, as I shall explain shortly, is something more than this.
Another way in which your intention might be thought to guide my actions 
would be if I were to act in a way that I thought was responsive to your wishes and 
intentions, such that I adopted your prior intentions as if they were my own. You 
shift the pan this way, causing me to pour in that way because I am concerned to 
fulfil what you had intended. But this also isn’t rational guidance – your intentions 
are here normatively influencing my intentional actions (they provide me with a 
reason to act in a certain way perhaps), but they are not rationally guiding my 
actions. They are not rationally guiding my actions because your intention, in this 
case, is not poised to control, intervene, correct or respond to my actions in pursuit 
of executing the prior intention.
Guidance, then, is not merely having one’s actions being causally affected by a 
prior event such as an intention (Frankfurt 1978), nor is it a matter of merely being 
rationally responsive to the intentions of another, as if satisfying another’s inten-
tions were a reason for my action. Rather, as already noted, rational guidance is a 
matter of having a multi-faceted capacity and skill to control, intervene in, respond 
to, or even ‘go with the flow’ with regards to, one’s actions in pursuit of the end 
specified in the content of the prior intention, such that one is able to anticipate 
effects, intervene to prevent mishaps, or respond to correct errors. If I am to be par-
tially rationally guided by your intentions (as aspects of a shared intention) then 
your intentions must be poised to partially control, intervene in, correct, step back 
from, or be responsive to, my actions in pursuit of our shared intention. That is to 
say: your intention <that we make a Hollandaise Sauce together by means of each 
of our intentions and meshing sub-plans> must be poised to have that kind of guid-
ing influence over my actions.
The present suggestion is that joint attention – in its full-blown ‘mutually mani-
fest’ guise – plays the functional role of enabling your intention, in combination 
with my intention, to have that guiding role over both your actions, and my actions, 
(which together constitute the joint action) by making mutually manifest the ele-
ments of the environment that contribute to fulfilling the corresponding elements of 
the prior plan of which our shared distal prior intention was the governing element. 
By making features of the environment mutually manifest, our actions will be 
directed, in meshing, complimentary ways, towards fulfilling the shared intentions 
and the shared plan. Without us being mutually aware of the relevant features of the 
environment in which we are operating (the objects, the processes, the actions and 
the ‘shared’, not purely ego-centric space in which this occurs), then we would be 
unable to update, adapt and consult the course of our shared plan – what needs to be 
done and what has been done – in the necessary way.
Part of what makes joint attention important here is that plans are partial and are 
flexible in means. As a consequence, the execution of some sub-intentions will be 
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on the fly. Suppose, for instance, that we have a partial plan involving numerous 
fairly fine-grained tasks that could be performed by either one of us when the time 
comes. If we are to operate broadly in synch with each other then we need to be 
aware of who has done what, who is doing what, and who should be doing what, 
when and how (given the present lay-out of the environment and present locations 
of the participants). The features of the environment dictate our actions insofar as 
they are features that will fulfil our plans and are located within our field of atten-
tion. Mere parallel attention will not allow us do this because, without knowing 
what the other agent is aware of, we will not be able to anticipate their actions; we 
will be unable to determine the layout of the environment that is available to them 
and at what stage of the shared plan they think we are at.
It might be thought that the agents need only have awareness of each other’s 
attention to the environment, but not that it be ‘mutually manifest’.15 But mutual 
manifestation has a role to play here which mere awareness of each other’s atten-
tion would not fulfil. If we are just aware of each other’s attention then, ex hypoth-
esis, we are not aware of the other’s awareness of our attention. That is to say, I 
might just think that you think that I am an inattentive fool. But this would play 
havoc with our activity. If a functional role of attention is to implement a multi-
faceted skill of guidance, then presumed inattentiveness on either of our parts 
should lead to the other constantly intervening and correcting for our predicted 
bumbling, inattentive actions. Consequently, if I suspect that you think that I am an 
inattentive fool, then I should expect you to constantly interfere in my actions, and 
I will be compensating for that.
Joint attention  – in its full-blown mutually manifest sense  – allows us to be 
guided by a prior shared intention and plan. It is because we are jointly attending to 
the environment and the features in it, that your intention and my intention (which 
comprise in the appropriate Bratmanian sense our shared intention) together ratio-
nally guide the joint action. We are together attentively monitoring the on-going 
activity – what needs to be done, what has been done, what needs correcting, what 
needs intervention, what needs skilled, automatic activity – in a way that is open. 
This openness is crucial. It enables both of us to anticipate, intervene, control and 
respond to the ongoing activity as a manifestation of a shared intention, rather than 
merely reactively responding to the other. These are manifestations of a shared 
intention because they are actions that are fulfilling and forwarding what is required 
in order to fulfil that intention as an element of a hierarchically ordered, structured 
and coordinated shared plan that, in its details, will be flexible and constantly 
updated. It is not merely the ongoing action, or the relevant elements of the environ-
ment, that are perceptually open to us as a manifestation of a shared intention, but 
also, when they occur, our respective tendencies to correct and intervene (e.g. I tell 
you to bring the pan closer, or you tell me to ‘watch out’ as I am about to drop 
the sauce).




If we are both attentive to the objects, locations, actions and events in front of 
us – and know that we are both so attentive – then we can immediately conceptual-
ise and frame the actions that are performed (be they controlled, intervening or cor-
recting) as actions that are directed towards, because guided by, a prior shared 
intention. Joint attention, because it interfaces with prior intentions, allows us to 
mutually recognise both the actions which are being intervened on, as well as the 
intervening actions, as manifestations of a prior shared intention.
8.3  Natural Intersubjectivity and Development
I have argued that minimal cooperation can interface with shared intentions by way 
of joint attention. Joint attention allows for an ongoing joint activity to be rationally 
guided and coordinated by a prior shared intention. The claim is that in such cases, 
there is no need to appeal to a more minimal concept of a ‘shared goal’.
A question which opens up about this, however, is what to say about three kinds 
of cases where there would appear to be joint activity, but where shared intentions 
are not operative (Tollefsen 2014). These are: (a) spontaneous, ‘flash mob’ joint 
actions; (b) interactions involving young children and infants; (c) interactions 
between animals. I shall focus on infant interaction, although more would need to 
be said about the others.16
8.3.1  The Development of Shared Intentions
I do not have space to fully develop the claim but I shall argue that joint attention 
and joint action play a developmental role in allowing children to engage in struc-
tured activities that, although not actually governed by shared intentions, are never-
theless enacted in a way that partially assumes the existence of shared intentions 
and shared plans. The capacity for joint attention allows infants to conceptualise the 
joint activities that they are engaged in as having a place within a wider normative 
structure, even when they are not yet capable of fully grasping that normative struc-
ture or the content of some of the elements of that structure.
16 Very briefly – I would argue that Flash Mob actions are defined in terms of their being self-con-
sciously unplanned. To the extent that this is part of their motivation and definition, then they are 
defined and motivated (negatively) in terms of planning. With regards to animal interaction, I 
would follow Tomasello et al. (2005) – or perhaps more specifically, Henrike Moll’s cultural trans-
formation version of that hypothesis (Moll 2016, 2018; Kern and Moll 2017) –that shared inten-
tionality is a defining feature of human uniqueness, and so animal interaction, unlike infant 
interactive cognition, is to be understood in a minimal way, along the lines suggested by Apperly 
and Butterfill (2009).
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It would be useful, I think, to begin with the metaphorical picture I sketched in 
Sect. 8.1 and that was operative in the background of the discussion in the previous 
section. We can think of plans as a kind of hierarchical diagram, with lines drawn 
from intentions to sub-intentions and from sub-intentions to sub-sub-intentions, and 
so on. As Bratman stresses, some sub-intentions will be bargained over (who does 
what when and how), so we can think of each of these boxes as being filled in with 
further content as and when the time comes, and boxes being added and taken away. 
Further, we can think of joint attention as allowing agents to (a) identify how to 
execute the sub-intention which appears in a sub-intention box, and then, (b) when 
the sub-intention has been executed, mentally ‘ticking’ the box, so as to mentally 
record its successful execution. Now, if, as I suggested before, shared plans are 
shared in a fairly robust way – they operate, functionally at least, like a wall-chart 
or online schedule which we can both edit – then we can see, as argued, in the previ-
ous section, why Joint Attention must be something more than parallel; it must be 
playing a public role to ensure that we are updating our copies of the plan together.
With this metaphor in hand, I want to suggest that infants and children often 
engage in activities with a sense that they are doing something as part of a larger, 
more structured prior shared plan, albeit a shared plan that they don’t fully under-
stand or have access to. They might engage in games with rules for instance, yet will 
not know the rules beforehand, and learn them through engaging in the activities 
themselves (Wittgenstein 1956; Bruner 1993). Similarly, children might engage in 
more informal plans, but not have a full idea of what the plan is. They understand 
that what they are doing has a role, and they can begin to piece it together as they 
proceed through the activity. So, it is a kind of reverse picture of the planning the-
ory: they might have a sense that there are ‘boxes’ to be ticked off and filled in, but 
not have an idea of how these boxes are structured, how they relate, or what their 
content is. Children will work from the activities to an understanding of the sub- 
plans to an understanding of the whole plan. In many cases, it might well be that the 
infants and children have an initial idea of a shared prior intention (‘that we make a 
cake together’), without yet having an understanding of either what it means for it 
to be genuinely shared, or what is required to fill it out. Their understanding of what 
is required for a plan to be shared comes about, on this picture, by means of engag-
ing and ‘pitching in’ (Paradise and Rogoff 2009) in collaborative activities. Only 
when they have mastered these activities, and the way that actions join with sub- 
intentions and sub-intentions with intentions, will they begin to see what a robust 
shared intention is.
By learning smaller activities involved in baking cakes, for instance, children 
will, as they go along, be learning how to fit those activities into a wider plan, and 
will come to see the activity as an intentional activity with the intention that p. In 
coming to engage in the activities, they might also eventually come to have an 
understanding of the complex structure of a shared intention; that is, of what it is to 
share an intention such that the content of one’s own plan is intertwined with the 
content of the other’s plan, and where one is responsive to the wishes and plans of 
the other and how they might mesh with one’s own.
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In some sense, this is illusory. There is no genuine shared intention between the 
caregiver and the infant. But the claim here is that the pedagogical attitude of a 
caregiver is (sometimes, in structured activities) one of a caregiver making a shared 
plan that is constructed as if it were equally the intention of the child, even when the 
child is not yet able to conceptualise the complex intentions that go into a shared 
intention, or the complex hierarchy by which it takes shape.
As with the adult case, joint attention plays a key role. By jointly attending, the 
participants are able to monitor, intervene, control and respond to the ongoing activ-
ity. At a very early stage, infants will almost always be the recipients of this guid-
ance. The guidance will come almost fully from the caregiver’s ersatz shared 
intention.
This view is related to the idea of Natural Pedagogy as developed by Gegerly and 
Csibra (2006), Csibra and Gegerly (2009, 2011), which postulates a “well-organ-
ised package of biases, tendencies and skills” (Gergely and Csibra 2006: 8) for 
learning on the side of children and infants, and a natural tendency towards struc-
tured teaching on the side of caregiver adults (Csibra and Gegerly 2011). Csibra and 
Gegerly’s focus is on the often cognitively opaque cultural knowledge that natural 
pedagogy helps develop; knowledge which children often take to be generic, hold-
ing across contexts and people (Egyed et al. 2013; Topál et al. 2008), and which is 
often imparted within a formal context. This suggests a relation between Minimal 
Cooperation and Massively Shared Agency. The focus here, however, has been on 
the development of understanding others’ plans and how those plans interact with 
one’s own actions and how this might develop into a more sophisticated capacity for 
shared intentions. This is a relation between Minimal Cooperation and the contin-
gent and local plans that arise in Modest Sociality, and is perhaps more closely 
related to what Barbara Rogoff calls ‘informal learning’ (Rogoff et al. 2016).
8.4  Concluding Remarks
To summarise, I have argued that we need an understanding of how Bratmanian 
shared intentions might interface with joint intentional actions, such that joint inten-
tional actions can be seen as executions of shared intentions, which track those prior 
shared intentions in a way that would allow us to say that the agents are jointly φ-ing 
with the intention that p. That this is something of a lacuna in traditional accounts 
of collective intentionality, is not a new complaint (see, e.g. Tollefsen and Dale 
2012, who call this the ‘execution problem’). But I have attempted to answer this 
question by arguing that joint attention plays a pivotal functional role in this by 
enabling the agents’ actions to be coordinated in a way that is rationally guided by 
and responsive to their prior shared intentions. Finally, I argued that this might help 
provide a framework for explaining the development of interactive skills within an 
informal learning environment.
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